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For policy reforms to increase a society's welfare, reliable information on people's prefer-
ences and expectations is crucial. Representative opinion polls, often involving simplified 
questions about the complex topics under debate, are an important source of information for 
both policy-makers and the public. Do people's answers to these poll questions reliably reflect 
their preferences and expectations, or does fundamental, undiscriminating opposition to 
reforms distort them? We address this question in the context of a recent German pension 
reform which raised the statutory retirement age by two years to age 67. By introducing an 
experiment into a representative household survey, we are able to disentangle expectations of 
work ability at retirement and fundamental opposition. Our results show that expected work 
ability declines substantially with increasing target age (63, 65, or 67 years). Answers from 
West German respondents reflect their current life situation as well as individual health and 
other risk factors. However, a fundamental opposition to reforms of the welfare state appears 
to strongly affect responses from East German households. 
JEL Code: J10, H30, H55, D84. 
Keywords: retirement, health, work ability, survey experiment, public opinion poll, PAYG 
pension system, East Germany. 
 
Beatrice Scheubel 
Center for Economic Studies at the 
University of Munich 
Schackstrasse 4 
Germany – 80539 Munich 
scheubel@lmu.de 
Daniel Schunk 
Institute for Empirical Research in 
Economics 
University of Zurich 
Blümlisalpstrasse 10 
Switzerland – 8006 Zürich 
dschunk@iew.uzh.ch 
Joachim Winter 
Department of Economics 
University of Munich 
Ludwigstrasse 28 RG 
Germany – 80539 Munich 
winter@lmu.de 
  
   
This version: August 2009 
The authors would like to thank Robert Fenge, Michael Haliassos, Ray Rees, Anno Stolper, 
and Hans-Werner Sinn as well as participants at IIPF 2008 Annual Conference, Maastricht for 
helpful comments and suggestions. Financial Support from the German National Research 
Foundation (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged. 1 Introduction
Information obtained from opinion polls is crucial for decisions on the design and
implementation of policies (Page and Shapiro 1984; Cukierman 1991; Morwitz and
Pluzinski 1996; BÄ utler 2000, 2002). Opinion polls provide important guidance for po-
litical decision-makers and stimulate the interaction between theoretical and empirical
researchers, thus enriching the policy discourse. In many political discussions about
welfare reforms, negative opinion poll results are taken as an important argument
against changes, encouraging some politicians to object the reform. After all, so the
argument goes, opinion polls are often the only between-election possibility for voic-
ing general and credible discontentment with politics and politicians in representative
democracies. In contrast, proponents of a reform may hold the view that information
obtained from opinion polls is unreliable and should not be taken as an important
argument in the debate about reform proposals.
The issue underlying these two di®erent views about the relevance of opinion poll
data is the question whether opinion polls re°ect people's preferences and expectations
with respect to speci¯c reform proposals, or whether fundamental opposition to reforms
distorts them. Polls on pension reforms are prominent examples of such contested
surveys, illustrating the importance of opinion pools and the controversy surrounding
them. Public opposition against pension reforms is pronounced, both in the United
States and in Europe (Burtless and Quinn 2000; Boeri et al. 2002; BÄ orsch-Supan et al.
2004). As an example, consider the German pension reform in 2007, which raised the
statutory retirement age by two years to age 67.1 Representative opinion polls such as
those shown in Figure 1 suggest that 70% of the population in former West Germany
and 80% of the population in former East Germany opposed the reform.
[Figure 1 about here]
1Details on the German pension system and the reform can be found in the appendix in section
A.1.
2In this paper, we use a unique survey experiment to provide evidence that funda-
mental opposition to reforms of the welfare state is re°ected in survey responses. We do
so by showing that survey responses are not driven by the underlying fundamentals {
such as expectations or preferences { but rather by an unwillingness to accept changes
in the status quo. Thus, the paper challenges an important assumption of many policy-
makers, namely that acting according to the opinion expressed in representative polls
is in the best interest of a society's welfare.
We use the German pension reform of 2007 mentioned above as an example and
focus on the main argument raised against its implementation: people's fear of low work
ability as they approach retirement, as stated frequently in opinion polls. Speci¯cally,
our study sheds light on the following two questions: (i) is the expression of those fears
of low work ability driven by people's underlying expectations about their future health
and, (ii) to what extent is it driven by fundamental opposition to the pension reform?
Generally, we ¯nd that work ability expectations vary meaningfully with individual
risk factors and are not generally driven by fundamental opposition to reforms. This
¯nding does not, however, apply to former communist East Germany. Our data provide
evidence that fundamental opposition considerably a®ects people's survey responses in
East Germany. This is in line with the recent literature on the impact of communism on
people's preferences and behavior (Ockenfels and Weimann 1999; Alesina and Fuchs-
SchÄ undeln 2007).
Our experiment asked the survey respondents for their expectations of work ability
at one speci¯c target age; the target age at which expected work ability was to be rated
was assigned randomly (63, 65, or 67 years). The speci¯c age is the only parameter
that di®ers between the three randomly assigned groups. Only one of the groups is
asked to state expected work ability at the age of 67, which implies a change in the
status quo of the pension system. By controlling for the determinants of true work
ability expectations, we can identify whether there is residual variation in answers and
whether this residual variation is signi¯cantly di®erent in the group that is exposed
to the experimental condition associated with a change in the status quo. Of course,
3in order to achieve our goal of separating fundamental opposition to reforms from
underlying expectations, fully controlling for other determinants of retirement behavior
is crucial. These determinants involve potential ¯nancial incentives for early or late
retirement, income, wealth, savings °ows, risk and time preferences, as well as socio-
demographic characteristics, health and life style in the speci¯c context of the work
ability argument we investigate. Detailed individual-level data on these variables are
typically not available for opinion polls. Our experiment was therefore embedded into
a representative household panel survey which includes all this information. Moreover,
we augment our survey data with administrative data on public pension entitlements.
Our work contributes to several distinct literatures. First, the increasing use of
survey data for empirical research raises questions about the reliability of individual
appraisals and subjective assessments (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). In particu-
lar, there is increasing interest in measuring individual expectations (Manski 2004), in
how these expectations are formed, and in whether they are formed rationally (Ben¶ ³tez-
Silva et al. 2008). Our study analyzes the potential bias in stated expectations when
there is the possibility of fundamental opposition to policies. Given the association
between individual expectations and actual retirement behavior { see, e.g., McGarry
(2004) and O'Donnell et al. (2008) { ¯nding out more about how these expectations
are formed thus helps to judge the feasibility of pension reforms.
Second, our work contributes to the literature on how to reform public Pay-As-You-
Go (PAYG) pension systems in the wake of demographic change (e.g., BÄ orsch-Supan
2003, 2004) and how to win political and public support for such reforms (Boeri and
Tabellini 2008). While raising the retirement age has long been considered the most
logical reform option for sustaining PAYG pension systems, the reasons why a large
fraction of the population does not support this reform option in so many countries are
less clear. Our experimental manipulation demonstrates clearly that many respondents
indeed believe they will become progressively less ¯t to work as they age and expect
a strongly negative work ability gradient between 63 and 67. Thus, if policy-makers
would like reforms, which raise the retirement age, to succeed, they have to address
4these concerns in order to mitigate the most important reform objections.
Finally, our results contribute to the literature on work ability. Controlling for
between-group variation in a multivariate regression analysis, we show that coe±cients
of individual risk factors such as health, satisfaction with work, or life expectancy are
signi¯cant determinants of expected work ability. Thus, the results of our survey
experiment corroborate ¯ndings in the medical literature on the determinants of work
ability (e.g. Tuomi et al. 2001).
The paper is laid out as follows. In section 2, we present a stylized model of govern-
ment and individual behavior that rationalizes a bias in publicly stated expectations
about work ability at the retirement age. We discuss the design of our experiment and
the household survey in which it was implemented in section 3. Section 4 contains our
regression results and several sensitivity analyses. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model, part of which builds on a setup
used in Diamond and Mirrlees (1978). The purpose is to show that when the govern-
ment chooses the statutory retirement age based on health signals, individuals may
have an incentive to send a false signal about their health expectations if they derive
additional utility from preserving the status quo. Thus, if the government ignored
the fact that the health signal is actually distorted because individuals fundamentally
oppose the reform, it would choose a retirement age that would be lower than the
retirement age that would be in the interest of the society.
2.1 Setup
Consider an economy with a government and a continuum of individuals. Each indi-
vidual lives for one period. The government and the individuals make decisions at the
beginning of the period. An individual is either healthy or unhealthy for the whole pe-
riod. Individuals do not know their health type at the beginning of the period. At this
5stage they can, however, form expectations about their health type. Individuals signal
their expectations about their health type to the government. Based on the health
signal, the government then chooses a uniform statutory retirement age, so that each
individual spends a fraction r working and is retired for fraction 1 ¡ r.2
There are three stages of decision-making at the beginning of the period. At stage
1, the government sets the tax rate ¿ which is used to ¯nance °at-rate pensions. At
stage 2, individuals form expectations about their health type and send a signal about
their type to the government. At stage 3, the government sets the statutory retirement
age. As the focus of our experiment is the bias in the individual signal, we present
only the analysis of stages 3 and 2 in detail.
Let µi denote the individual probability of being the healthy type. The individual
signal of the probability of being healthy is denoted by ^ µi. The continuum of individ-
uals is normalized to unity, such that the ex ante probability distribution of healthy
individuals translates into the composition of the population of healthy and unhealthy
individuals. There is a fraction µi of healthy individuals and a fraction (1 ¡ µi) of
unhealthy individuals.
An individual earns wage w for each unit of output. If working life is of length r,
the individual produces r units of output. If an individual is unhealthy, he is able to
work, but will have a lower productivity. For convenience, we normalize the wage to
wH = 1 if an individual is healthy and to wL = 1
2 if an individual is unhealthy.
Let c denote consumption. Consumption in working life must be ¯nanced by dis-
posable income, (1 ¡ ¿)wr. Let c1 denote consumption if the individual is healthy. c1
is hence given by
c1 = (1 ¡ ¿)r: (1)
Let c2 denote consumption if the individual is unhealthy. c2 is hence given by




2By uniform we mean that the government does not set di®erent retirement ages for healthy and
ill individuals.
6For the fraction 1¡r, the government pays the transfer c3, which is ¯nanced with tax
revenue. c3 is hence given by




There is no private saving in the economy.
An individual derives utility u1(c) when working and u2(c) when not working.
We assume a disutility of work component in u1, such that u2(c) ¸ u1(c)8c. The
utility functions are assumed to possess the usual properties. We assume that there
is additional utility attached to the state of being retired instead of working. This
utility, uR(oi), is only realized when the individual does not work. It depends on an
individual preference parameter which we denote by oi. This parameter captures the
additional utility attached to preserving the status quo retirement age, and the higher
oi, the higher the utility from being retired,
@uR(oi)
@oi > 0.
Given the proportion µi of healthy individuals, once the tax rate ¿ and thus con-
sumption levels when working, c1 and c2, are set, the distribution of consumption
between working and non-working life can only be a®ected via the length of working
life r. This relationship between r and c3 is re°ected in the ex ante individual budget
constraint, i.e. before the health type is revealed, which equates total lifetime income
with total lifetime consumption:





= r[µic1 + (1 ¡ µi)c2] + (1 ¡ r)c3(¿;µi;r): (4)
Expected lifetime utility for individual i is then given by
vi(r) = r[µiu1(c1) + (1 ¡ µi)u1(c2)] + (1 ¡ r)[u2(c3) + uR(oi)]: (5)
2.2 The government's choice of the retirement age r
When the government decides on the optimal retirement age (i.e. the length of working
life, r), it takes into account the tax rate ¿ it set at the ¯rst stage and the health signal
^ µi, which the individuals sent at the second stage. The opposition parameter oi is
7unobserved and not taken into account when choosing the optimal length of working
life. The government chooses the optimal length of working life according to
vG = ^ µi[ru1(c1) + (1 ¡ r)u2(c3)] + (1 ¡ ^ µi)[ru1(c2) + (1 ¡ r)u2(c3)]; (6)
subject to the following constraints:
c1 = (1 ¡ ¿)r
c2 = (1 ¡ ¿)
r
2




If individuals signal their true expectation µi = ^ µi, the government will choose
a higher retirement age than individuals would prefer. The government chooses the
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The length of working life r¤
G the government chooses is longer than the length r¤
preferred by the individual as long as the utility from preserving the status quo uR(oi)
is positive.
2.3 The individual's choice of the health signal ^ µi
An individual has an incentive to misrepresent his true expectation of being healthy
in the second stage (^ µi 6= µi) if a lower signaled probability of being healthy induces
the government to choose a shorter length of working life in the third stage. This is
8the case whenever the fraction of healthy individuals in the society is low or when the
e®ect of a change in the length of working life has a strong e®ect on the attainable
consumption level during retirement.3
If there is a di®erence between stated and true expectations, the di®erence will be
determined by the two optimality conditions, that is to say, by the di®erence between















In equation 9, a number of factors determine the bias in signaled health expecta-
tions: First, it increases in the individual utility attached to maintaining the status quo
uR(oi). Second, it decreases with a decrease in the di®erence between the utility when
working and healthy and the utility when not working and healthy (u1(c1) ¡ u1(c2)).
Third, it is a®ected by the trade-o® between the length of working life r and its e®ect











Work ability expectations depend on a number of well-known individual health
and other risk factors (see Tuomi et al. 2001, for example) as well as on individual
socio-demographic and economic characteristics (see, e.g. Adams et al. 2003; Munnell
et al. 2008). Importantly, our model implies that { unless consumption possibilities
were very similar when healthy and unhealthy, which they are not under a uniform
proportional tax rate { a bias in stated health expectations should always remain.
3It can also be shown that the government has the possibility to a®ect the extent of the bias in
the signal by setting the tax rate ¿ in the ¯rst stage. The presentation of the ¯rst stage decision
is omitted here. Intuitively, while the relation between working life consumption when healthy and
when unhealthy is ¯xed in the model, the only way to correct for the bias is the e®ect of the length of
working life on retirement bene¯ts via the tax rate. The government however faces a trade-o® between
consumption smoothing and correcting for the bias.
93 Design and implementation of the survey experiment
The empirical analysis presented in the remainder of the paper focuses on investigating
whether the bias we illustrated in the theoretical model in the previous section distorts
the health signal the government obtains from questions typically asked in surveys or
opinion polls. We thus ask: Is there evidence that stated individual expectations of
work ability are a®ected not only by underlying health, risk and socio-demographic
factors, but also by unobservable fundamental opposition? To isolate such an e®ect, we
experimentally manipulate the e®ect fundamental opposition can have on responses.
We ask a question on work ability expectations for di®erent target ages, but only
one of the experimental conditions is associated with a change in status quo (i.e., a
change in r). In order to control for any other e®ects which might drive opposition to
pension reforms, we need detailed information on individual health, risk factors, and
the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics, including their pension claims. We
achieve this by embedding our experiment into a large panel survey which had already
collected all this information. Our analysis can thus attribute any remaining variation
in stated work ability expectations to fundamental opposition.
This section describes the German SAVE survey in which the experiment was
embedded and our experimental design.
3.1 The SAVE survey
Our goal is to identify potential fundamental opposition in stated work ability expecta-
tions. We make use of the fact that the determinants of true work ability, such as health
and risk factors, are both well-known in the literature and measured in our survey. We
use the determinants of work ability as proxies for true work ability expectations.
Our econometric model, as explained below in detail, thus includes the determinants
of work ability, such as detailed information on health expectations, domain-speci¯c
measures of risk, and a measure for time preference as controls. Furthermore, we must
also control for institutional features of the pension system, in particular the implicit
10tax on continued work, and for individual savings behavior. In order to do so, we also
include savings measures and an estimate of accrued pension claims in our model, in
addition to the usual socio-demographic variables. Finally, to proxy the underlying
true work ability, we include its observable determinants: detailed individual health
measures, current age, and satisfaction with work (see, e.g., Tuomi et al. 1997).
The German SAVE survey, a representative panel study which the University of
Mannheim conducts in collaboration with TNS Infratest, is speci¯cally designed to
study retirement and savings behavior of German households. The survey started in
2001 and has been repeated annually since 2003. It records detailed information on
¯nancial variables (such as income, savings, and asset holdings), socio-demographic and
psychological characteristics (such as job characteristics, preferences and expectations),
and health status of the respondents. The data universe for the SAVE survey is
all German language households in Germany with a household head of eighteen or
older. Interviewees were selected from a multiply strati¯ed multistage random sample
augmented with a small quota sample. Table A.2 in the appendix contains descriptive
statistics on all variables we use in our analyses. Further details on the data background
as well as methodological information on the SAVE survey are presented in section A.2
of the appendix.
For this paper, we use data from the 2006 wave of the German SAVE panel study
(which contained our survey experiment) appended with data from the 2007 wave for
certain speci¯cations.
3.2 The experiment
We included a controlled experiment in the 2006 wave of the SAVE survey. The
complete survey was identical for all respondents, except for the experimental question
on work ability. There were three di®erent versions to this question, and respondents
were randomly assigned to answer one of them. A question on (expected) work ability
was asked for the ¯rst time in SAVE 2006. Therefore, the experimental nature is
also ensured for those respondents who were members of the panel in previous years.
11Furthermore, our experimental question was the last question on the questionnaire,
thus preventing repercussions on answers to any other question asked in the survey,
such as the question on expected retirement age or any of the large battery of questions
on individual health.
Our experiment in the SAVE survey was conducted in the year before both houses of
the German parliament ¯nally passed the reform which raised the statutory retirement
age. At the time of our experiment, the German parliament discussed raising of the
statutory retirement age from 65 to 67, and this discussion was prominent in the
media. Thus, individual opinions concerning the plans to increase the retirement age
are likely to bias work ability expectations. By starting the experimental question with
reference to the corresponding political context, we ensured that each respondent was
in the same frame when answering the question. In other words, if the framing of the
question resulted in biased responses, the bias would be identical for all respondents.
The wording of the question was as follows:
To conclude this survey, we would like to ask you a question on current pension politics.
Please only answer the question if you are not older than 60.
Certainly you have already heard of the Grand Coalition's plans to gradually raise the
statutory retirement age in order to avoid further curtailing of pensions. Do you think
that you would be able to cope with your job's requirements at the age of X?
0 10
↑ ↑
Not at all De¯nitely
In Germany, the average retirement age among pensioners is currently about 60
years (e.g, for the cohort born in 1941 it is 60.6 years). Average retirement age is only
slightly higher if disabled retirees are excluded. Therefore, only respondents up to age
60 were asked the experimental question.4 These respondents were randomly divided
4In the empirical analysis presented in this paper, we also exclude respondents who were already
retired at an age below 60 as well as the self-employed and civil servants; for details, see appendix A.2.
12into three groups of equal size associated with one value of the variable X from the
set (63, 65, and 67). Respondents were asked to rate their expected work ability at
age X on a scale from 1 to 10. As the statutory retirement age in Germany was 65
at the time of the experiment, one group was asked to rate their expected future work
ability at that age. The second group was asked for their expected work ability at 63,
and the third group for their expected work ability at the age of 67, the age to which
the statutory retirement age should be raised according to the reform plans.
Comparing these three randomly assigned groups, which only di®er with respect to
the age at which they are asked to rate their expected work ability, is informative with
respect to two issues. First, the experiment is a between-subjects design informing us
whether work ability expectations truly decrease in a random sample of the population:
if respondents expect their work ability to decrease with age, average work ability
should be lower in the 67 group than in the 65 group and lower in the 65 group than
in the 63 group. That is to say, we would observe a monotone decrease in work ability.
Second, we learn about the potential bias due to fundamental opposition to a reform,
which raises the retirement age to 67: If fundamental opposition plays a signi¯cant role,
we should expect the 67 group to behave fundamentally di®erent from the expected
monotone decrease.
Our experimental design and the large coronary of additional data thus enable us
to link the variation in stated work ability expectations, which cannot be related to
underlying risk factors, to fundamental opposition.
4 Results
In this section, we present the empirical analysis of the data from our survey exper-
iment. Our results show that expected work ability stated by West German survey
respondents varies with known risk factors. Fundamental opposition to reforms causes
bias in the responses from East German participants, however. These results are rep-
resentative for the German population aged 18 to 59 (excluding the self employed and
civil servants, as these groups are not covered by the statutory pay-as-you-go pension
13system). We provide a detailed discussion of our sample as well as descriptive statistics
in appendix A.2.
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. We begin by comparing the responses to
our main survey question between treatment groups in order to illustrate the e®ect of
the experimental manipulation. We then estimate multivariate regression models that
control for the determinants of individual retirement choices. We include three types
of variables. First, we control for variables that determine the individual retirement
choice (demographic characteristics, savings, wealth, and pension claims as well as data
on risk and time preferences). Second, we control for known determinants of future
work ability (in particular various subjective and objective health measures). Finally,
we augment our survey data with administrative data on social security pensions to
capture incentives provided by the German pension system. Throughout, we also
investigate potential di®erences between respondents in East and West Germany.
4.1 Expected work ability at 63, 65, and 67
We ¯rst report descriptive statistics on the responses to the experimental question.
Table 1 displays mean and median work ability for the three experimental groups,
separately for East and West Germany. Pooling data from all three treatment groups,
we ¯nd that more than 70% of West German respondents and nearly 80% of East
German respondents rate their expected work ability around retirement as low (equal
to or lower than 5 on an eleven-point scale). Moreover, median work ability is only 3
and 2 on the eleven-point scale in West and East Germany, respectively.
In West Germany, mean and median work ability decrease monotonically with the
experimental manipulation of the time horizon, as we hypothesized. Signi¯cant di®er-
ences between the three experimental groups for median work ability, respectively, are
con¯rmed by a Kruskal-Wallis test for the West German sample (p < 0:0001). Equal-
ity of population medians cannot be rejected for the East German sample, however
(p = 0:2985). These results suggest that although opposition e®ects do not seem to
14bias responses in West Germany, they do seem to matter in the East. In the following,
we proceed with a multivariate analysis that substantiates this claims.
[Table 1 about here]
4.2 Multivariate analysis
The dependent variable in our multivariate analysis is expected work ability at re-
tirement age. Our regressions can be interpreted as reduced-form speci¯cations of
equation (9) which we derived from our theoretical model. Since expected work ability
was measured on an eleven-point scale in the survey, we use an ordered probit model
in which the observed ordered response is determined by unobserved (latent) expected
work ability, which in turn is speci¯ed as a linear index that combines a large number
of explanatory variables:
^ µ¤
i = xi¯x + pi¯p ¡ qj¯q + ui : (10)
Here, the vector xi collects determinants of true work ability expectations µ¤
i, pi
includes additional variables which might a®ect the incentive to de°ate stated work
ability expectations, and qj denotes the questionnaire indicators with j 2 (63;65;67).
That is to say, pi should include any individual (future) consumption levels, such
as income and savings, as well as demographic indicators and whether someone is
a®ected by the reform. The unknown parameter vectors are denoted by ¯q, ¯x, and
¯p, respectively. We assume that the error term, ui, is normally distributed and
statistically independent of the regressors, which gives rise to an ordered probit model
that we estimate by maximum likelihood.
First, we estimate a model speci¯cation which includes demographic indicators as
well as ¯nancial and institutional controls. Our second speci¯cation further includes
health, health expectations, and job details. We ¯nally add social security data to
control for di®erences in respondents' public pension accounts in our third speci¯cation.
The results are displayed in table 2 and table 3, for West Germany and East Germany,
respectively.
15[Table 2 about here]
[Table 3 about here]
Our main result is already highlighted by comparing speci¯cation (1) in tables 2 and
3. This speci¯cation includes demographic indicators, income and wealth variables.
Demographic indicators in particular can capture political preferences, which may
lead to the repulsion of the reform; thus our estimation controls for opposition to
the reform that is related to respondent characteristics.5 We ¯nd that both indicator
variables for the questionnaires are signi¯cant and have the hypothesized sign in the
West German sample, suggesting a monotone decrease in expected work ability with
age. However, work ability is signi¯cantly higher in the 63 group and in the 67 group
in East Germany { a pattern which contradicts the hypothesis that respondents have
reported expectations that are meaningful given their actual life situation.6 Hence,
while opposition e®ects do not seem to bias responses in West Germany, they do
seem to matter in the East. Note that our estimations above also include information
on various sources of old-age income. This even includes wealth in private pension
schemes. Most of these variables are highly signi¯cant in both parts of the country.
Still, there is no indication of fundamental opposition in the West, while the opposition
5In appendix section A.3 we show that demographic characteristics can indeed explain a large
fraction of opposition against the reform in opinion poll data. In addition, speci¯cation (1) contains
an indicator variable of being a®ected by the reform and an indicator variable for respondents who
experienced German reuni¯cation as adults.
6We should mention that the observed pattern does not only contradict the initial hypothesis in
the sense of not ¯nding support for a monotone decrease in expectations, but that health expectations
seem to be even higher at 67 than at 65 in East Germany. Further analysis suggests that this increase
in expectations is driven by a speci¯c group of respondents in the East: Respondents who { due to the
poor employment situation there { have experienced strong income °uctuations in the past, are thus
very uncertain about their future work situation, expect an inadequate retirement income, and might
therefore anyhow anticipate that they will have to work beyond the usual retirement age in any case.
Moreover, if we fully interact the models estimated in tables 2 and 3 with an indicator variable for
large income °uctuations in the past 5 years, we ¯nd that the dummies for the treatments 63 and 67
become insigni¯cant and low in magnitude in the East sample but not in the West sample { another
indication of an opposition e®ect in the East.
16e®ect in the East remains.
While the reaction to our experiment among West German respondents seems
to con¯rm that West Germans expect their work ability to decrease with age, we
still have to show that this corresponds to true expectations. This is what we do in
speci¯cation (2). We approximate true expectations by including the determinants of
work ability as explanatory variables, which have been proven to be the most important
determinants of work ability in previous research. Speci¯cally, we include several
measures of subjective health, health expectations, and objective health measures. In
addition, previous research suggests that life style { including smoking habits or the
type of work, in particular if it is physically demanding { and job satisfaction play
a great role (e.g., Tuomi et al. 1997). We thus also include these measures as well
as domain-speci¯c measures of risk. Speci¯cation (2) in tables 2 and 3 displays our
results including these determinants of work ability.
Several work, health and life style variables signi¯cantly a®ect answers in both
East Germany and West Germany. The most important determinants of work ability,
however, show the expected e®ect in West Germany, but not in East Germany. For
instance, both smokers and respondents working in a physically demanding job have
signi¯cantly lower work ability expectations in the West, but not in the East. We
conclude that stated work ability expectations indeed contain information about true
expectations, because all underlying risk factors correlate with stated expectations in
a reasonable way. A pooled model with full interactions for East-West di®erences how-
ever reveals that the general picture of stated expectations being driven by individual
risk factors does not apply to East German respondents. Stated expectations are thus
likely to be biased by fundamental opposition among East German respondents (see
also section 4.3 for further details).
4.3 Sensitivity of the results
In Germany, the level of the pension claim depends on the amount of lifetime con-
tribution payments. These strongly depend on income. So far, we have argued that
17income e®ects on the retirement decision are best captured by including data on cur-
rent income7 and measures of risk aversion. In addition, we also used demographic
indicators and economic expectations, which have proven to be strong determinants
of whether someone supports the reform in the regression analysis using opinion poll
data (shown in appendix section A.3). We also controlled for numerous individual risk
factors, such as health conditions. In the speci¯cation presented in this section, we ad-
ditionally control for incentives provided by the German pension system. For instance,
insu±cient pension claims could possibly have caused our observation in speci¯cations
(1) and (2) of table 3 that East Germans even seem to expect to be more able to work
at the age of 67 than at 65.
We augment our data with German social security data (Forschungsdatenzentrum
der deutschen Rentenversicherung 2008), in particular with measures of individual
pension entitlements. The German social security data set we use consists of a 1%
random sample (385,503 observations) of all Germans contributing to the public pen-
sion system in 2005. For all individuals in the sample, we know exactly the number
of pension credits (Entgeltpunkte) accumulated in 2004 and by 2005, for which spell
of employment these credits were accrued, and for how many months the person was
unemployed in the respective year. We also know the year of ¯rst contribution to the
system and non-contribution times that were recognized as contribution times.8 We
match these numbers to each respondent in our main data set conditional on a set of
socio-demographic variables (federal state of residence, gender, age, and type of job).9
Speci¯cation (3) in tables 2 and 3 shows the results of speci¯cations that include
variables such as employment biography and contributions to the system. None of the
coe±cients we are interested in change much, and we still observe a monotone decline
7Note that our data also allow us to identify precisely those who work in a job that is not covered
by social security.
8This refers, for example, to the ¯rst weeks of maternity leave or unemployment, when an employee
does not have to actively contribute to the system. The employer does so for him or her, in accordance
with German legal provisions.
9We lose one observation of our original data set in this process. This is due to age restrictions.
18in work ability expectations with age for the West German sample, but not for the East
German sample. Focusing on the newly included variables in speci¯cation (3), we ¯nd
that a later year of ¯rst contribution (i.e., a shorter total time span for contributing
to the system) has a negative e®ect in East Germany, but the e®ect is positive in
West Germany. Furthermore, accrued pension credits in 2005 and 2004 as well as
spells of non-contribution times do not have a signi¯cant in°uence (not displayed in
the tables). In contrast, non-contribution times have a weak but signi¯cantly positive
e®ect in Eastern Germany.10 More importantly, the accrued pension credits are not
signi¯cant in either part of the country. We are thus con¯dent that our strategy of
including detailed information on income and savings has indeed captured the most
important incentive e®ects of the pension system which may cause di®erences in the
preferred retirement age.
To make sure that the persistent di®erences in the reaction between East and West
German responses in our data are not caused by di®erences in other variables either,
we show that the characteristics of East and West German respondents do not di®er
signi¯cantly in a detailed comparison of the samples in appendix section A.2. We
also estimate a fully interacted model of East-West di®erences, the results of which are
displayed in speci¯cation (1) in table 4. While there is no di®erence between the higher
level of work ability in the 63 group as compared to the 65 group between East and
West Germany, there is a signi¯cant di®erence between the East and West German
sample for the 67 group. This con¯rms the results of tables 2 and 3.
In our multivariate analysis we have ruled out health as the cause of East-West
di®erences by including subjective and objective health measures. It could be, how-
ever, that the di®erences are caused by unobserved di®erences in work ability. To
see whether this is plausible, we also ran the fully interacted speci¯cation including
the self-employed and public o±cials, who are una®ected by the reform. Results for
selected variables are displayed in speci¯cation (2) in table 4. All ¯ndings with re-
10This e®ect is related to the fact that the unemployment rate in the East is very high; more
information can be obtained from the authors upon request.
19spect to the reaction to our experiment remain unchanged, lending support to our
interpretation that fundamental opposition plays a role for respondents from Eastern
Germany.
[Table 4 about here]
A ¯nal concern that we need to address is that the health variables included in
our regressions are self-reported and thus potentially subject to di®erential bias. We
thus also investigate health di®erences between East and West based on an established
objective measure of health, namely maximum hand grip strength (e.g., Kuh et al.,
2005). Our analysis uses data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
(SHARE), and it is presented in the appendix, section A.4. Maximum grip strength
varies with gender and age, but not between East and West Germany. We are therefore
con¯dent that variations in health status do not drive di®erences between East and
West Germans in our analysis.
4.4 A note on communism and preferences
Recent research has argued that Communism signi¯cantly shaped people's attitudes,
beliefs and behavior in a signi¯cant manner (e.g., Alesina and Fuchs-SchÄ undeln 2007;
Ockenfels and Weimann 1999). Our data basically con¯rm this view. In particular, a
variable indicating childhood and adolescence spent under communism, is signi¯cant
in East Germany in speci¯cation (4) in table 3.
We should stress that this result is not due to the large and persistent di®erences
in unemployment rates between East and West Germany. We control for regional
unemployment rates, individual unemployment, and past unemployment in 2004 and
2005, in all regressions. Moreover, we also control for the impact of unemployment on
pension entitlements in our multivariate regressions.
205 Conclusions
Persistent opposition to pension reforms is a widespread phenomenon in many countries
that struggle to maintain the sustainability of their pay-as-you-go pension system. As
a consequence, policy-makers facing reelection are confronted with incentives to avert
pension reforms. It is not clear, however, to what extent the persistent opposition
against pension reforms expressed in opinion polls re°ects the electorate's underlying
preferences and expectations, or rather mirrors fundamental opposition to reforms. If
the latter were the case, the implementation of reforms could be welfare-enhancing
even if polls clearly suggest the contrary. It is thus of fundamental interest to learn
more about the extent to which simple opinion poll questions re°ect factors other than
underlying preferences and expectations related to a speci¯c reform proposal.
To investigate whether fundamental opposition to pension reforms really is an issue,
we study whether the arguments that people put forward against a speci¯c reform
proposal are reasonable given their life situation. We use an experiment embedded
in a representative survey and investigate a prominent argument against raising the
retirement age: people's fear of low work ability as they approach the retirement age.
Speci¯cally, we use the context of a German pension reform, which was implemented
in 2007 and raised the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67.
Our data convey three main results. First, the main concern in the public discussion
{ that people become increasingly unable to work beyond the age of 65 { is clearly
re°ected in individual expectations. Second, we ¯nd no evidence for an additional
downward bias in stated work ability expectations due to fundamental opposition in
West Germany. This suggests that opposition in West Germany is only caused by the
concern of becoming less able to work with increasing age and not by fundamental
opposition. Third, our experimental design reveals that there is additional variation
in expected work ability in East Germany, which cannot be linked to underlying risk
factors and health expectations and which we interpret as evidence for fundamental
opposition.
21Our results o®er two important insights. First, our experiment reveals persistent
di®erences between East and West Germany that cannot be linked to di®erences in
risk factors or the life situation. This challenges an important assumption of many
policy-makers, namely that acting according to the opinions expressed in representative
polls always is in the best interest of a society's welfare. Our analysis underlines the
urgency of addressing discontentment with politics and the welfare state in the former
communist Eastern part of Germany.
Second, our data suggest that simple rating questions can provide valuable infor-
mation in the sense that responses re°ect people's underlying life situation and their
concerns and expectations. Speci¯cally, with the help of our experimental manipula-
tion, we ¯nd that expected work ability decreases substantially between age 63 and
67, suggesting that the fear of being unable to work is a serious concern among the
electorate.
At the same time, recent research shows that people live longer (Oeppen and Vau-
pel 2002), that the incidence of old-age disability decreases (e. g. Manton and Gu,
2001), and that neither health-related absence nor productivity decrease with age
(BÄ orsch-Supan and Weiss 2008). Hence there seems to be a growing consensus among
researchers that it is not only necessary to increase the retirement age, but that workers
in many occupations can be productive beyond the current retirement age. Boosting
acceptance of such a reform thus requires policy-makers to increase awareness of the
fact that life expectancy is rising, that people stay healthier at older ages than ever be-
fore, and that they do not rapidly lose their productivity in many jobs even beyond age
60. As long as voters are not informed about their health prospects and the e®ects that
ageing may or may not have on their work ability, they are unlikely to endorse reforms
that would raise the retirement age. Since work ability and health expectations are
a good predictor of actual retirement behavior (e. g. McGarry 2004), policy-makers
must address people's concerns about low work ability expectations more fervently
if they wish policy reforms that raise the statutory retirement age and enhance the
sustainability of the pension system to be ultimately successful.
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26Appendix
A.1 Institutional rules for public old-age pensions in German
The increase in the retirement age was one of the last steps of the tentative implemen-
tation of the suggestions by the RÄ urup-Kommission, which was the scienti¯c advisory
council to the Government and which presented suggestions on how to reform the
German Public PAYG pension system in 1999. Some of these suggestions were imple-
mented under Chancellor Gerhard SchrÄ oder, who was in o±ce between 2002 and 2004.
The increase in the statutory retirement age was, however, only reintroduced by the
Grand Coalition under Chancellor Angela Merkel, with a long transition period (2012
{ 2029). It was passed in both houses of parliament in March 2007. Reform details
are presented in table A.1.
A.2 The SAVE survey and sample de¯nition
The SAVE study: The SAVE household panel survey was started in 2001 with the
aim of gaining a more thorough understanding of the savings and retirement behavior
of German private households. It has emerged as a cooperation project of researchers
from the University of Mannheim, the Mannheim Center for Surveys, Methods and
Analyses (ZUMA), NFO Infratest (Munich), Psychonomics (Cologne) and Sinus (Hei-
delberg). The survey design was based on the Dutch CentER panel and the U.S.
Health and Retirement Study (HRS). To our knowledge, the German SAVE panel is
currently the only panel study which combines a large set of micro data with rich and
particularly detailed information on household saving and its determinants. This is
of vital importance for our study, since we not only control for the ¯nancial deter-
minants of retirement behavior, such as both private and public saving °ows for old
age, but also for health, health expectations, risk and time preferences, and a huge
set of socio-demographic variables. Combined with further information about relevant
individual level determinants of retirement behavior, such as expected old age pro-
vision, general economic expectations, job satisfaction, life-style etc., the SAVE data
o®er a unique possibility to gain a detailed picture of the factors that can in°uence a
27household's retirement decision. Details on the SAVE data, on the sampling scheme,
item non-response, imputation procedures, weighting, and data quality can be found
in BÄ orsch-Supan et al. (2008). Here, we provide only a brief summary.
Item nonresponse, imputation, and weighting: Item nonresponse in SAVE
mainly occurs with sensitive questions on the respondent's ¯nancial situation; item
nonresponse rates are similar to item nonresponse rates in other surveys (see BÄ orsch-
Supan et al., 2008). To prevent biased inference based on an analysis of only complete
cases, a Markov chain Monte Carlo imputation procedure was applied to the SAVE
data (see Schunk, 2008). The imputation procedure explicitly takes the available in-
formation in all di®erent waves into account, thus ensuring maximum data quality.
The method replaces missing data by drawing from an estimate of the conditional dis-
tribution of the data, and the Markov chain Monte Carlo process converges robustly
in only few iteration steps. We also conducted all our analyses with the sample of
non-imputed data only, but results are hardly a®ected. More information on this is
found in the next section. Socio-demographic representativeness of the SAVE panel is
ensured by a weighting scheme according to the German Micro Census (Mikrozensus).
Sample de¯nition: The sample for our analyses consists of individuals at working age
who are a®ected by the pension reform. As the self-employed are not covered by the
public PAYG pension system we exclude them from our analysis. A similar reasoning
applies to respondents who are employed in public service. Although they are covered
by a PAYG pension scheme, this is administered di®erently and in a slightly more
generous way compared to the standard scheme. We thus exclude this group from
our analysis as well. In order to account for remaining di®erences with respect to the
type of job, all our analyses control for both physical ¯tness and physically demanding
tasks, as well as for the type of job. We restrict the remaining sample to individuals
aged 59 or younger, because the e®ective retirement age in Germany is clearly below
the statutory retirement age of 65. We also exclude respondents, who are already
retired or are in early retirement due to disability from our sample. Out of the original
data set of 3,474 observations in the 2006 wave, 1,852 remain in our sample. Table
28A.2 shows the number of respondents in each group in East and West Germany.
Summary statistics and di®erences between East and West Germany: Apart
from di®erences in unemployment, the East and West German samples do not di®er
with respect to key characteristics. In particular, it is also important to note that the
East and West samples do not di®er signi¯cantly with respect to job type, an important
determinant of work ability expectations. Table A.2 shows that the main di®erences
between our East and West German samples can indeed be related to the much higher
unemployment rate in the East. The unemployment rate in East Germany is almost
24% in the sample. This is slightly higher than the o±cial ¯gure 20.6% for 2005. The
proportion of respondents who experienced strong income °uctuations during the past
5 years is also higher in the East, which can be related to di±culties in ¯nding gainful
employment. This is in line with the average household income per household member,
which is higher in West Germany. Not surprisingly, West Germans are somewhat more
satis¯ed with work, expect a better individual economic situation and better health in
the future, and expect to live slightly longer than East Germans.11
A.3 Attitudes towards reforms in the Politbarometer
Another potential candidate for explaining the di®erence between East and West Ger-
many might be a general opposition to reforms of the welfare state in the East which
is caused by a higher preference for redistribution in the former Communist part of
Germany, or by di®erences in opportunities in life caused by the di±cult employment
situation in the East. We use data from German opinion polls on the pension reform
to check for the main determinants of individual opposition. Summary statistics for
the opinion poll data are displayed in table A.3.
11The variable life expectancy is measured in a complicated procedure consisting of three di®erent
survey questions. Respondents are asked, ¯rst, how they estimate the average life expectancy of their
cohort for both genders separately. Second, they are asked whether they expect to live just as long,
longer, or shorter than their cohort. In a third step, respondents are asked to estimate the number of
years which they expect to live longer or shorter.
29Table A.4 shows a probit analysis of the probability of supporting the reform which
raised the statutory retirement age to 67. This analysis is based on the representative
opinion poll data from the Politbarometer. The analysis clearly reveals that East Ger-
man respondents are ceteris paribus less likely to support the reform. It further shows
that supporting the reform is mainly determined by indicators which are related to
how many pension credits someone has already accumulated and also to their potential
for accruing a higher pension if they continue working. In particular, gender, educa-
tion, and employment play a large role. Unfortunately, the opinion polls do not ask
for information on income, which is why we could not include this information in our
analysis. Overall, table A.4 gives important insights as to which variables are related to
a negative attitude towards the reform. In particular, this con¯rms that many control
variables we use for identi¯cation of a fundamental bias from between-groups variation
in our SAVE survey experiment are crucial for identifying a fundamental opposition
e®ect.
A.4 Objective health di®erences between East and West Germany
As we have shown, the SAVE data suggest that there are no di®erences in health sta-
tus between East and West Germans. The SAVE data, however, contain subjective,
self-rated health measures. Objective health data, which does not involve a subjective
rating, may convey a di®erent picture. Thus, we additionally check whether an es-
tablished objective measure of health, hand grip strength, di®ers signi¯cantly between
East and West Germany. Grip strength was measured in a representative sample of
Germans aged 50 and above in the context of the the Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database
of micro data on health, socioeconomic status and social and family networks.12
12We used data from SHARE Waves 1 and 2, as of December 2008. In 2004-2007, SHARE data
collection was primarily funded by the European Commission through its 5th and 6th framework
programmes (project numbers QLK6-CT-2001- 00360; RII-CT- 2006-062193; CIT5-CT-2005-028857).
Additional funding by the US National Institute on Aging (grant numbers U01 AG09740-13S2; P01
AG005842; P01 AG08291; P30 AG12815; Y1-AG-4553-01; OGHA 04-064; R21 AG025169) as well as
30We do not ¯nd that our objective measure of health di®ers between East and West
Germans. Figure A.1 shows that this objective measure of health declines with age
and that there are di®erences between men and women, but there are no di®erences
between East and West Germans within these groups. This result is con¯rmed in a
regression analysis which is available from the authors upon request.
by various national sources is gratefully acknowledged.
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Source (data): Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2007)
Table 1: Expected work ability in the three experimental groups
West East
Mean Med. Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Med. Std. Dev. Obs.
Exp. group 63 4.24 4 3.12 440 3.11 2 3.06 167
Exp. group 65 3.37 3 3.12 457 2.53 2 2.62 164
Exp. group 67 3.04 2 2.93 453 3.00 2 3.26 171
Obs. 1,350 502
32Table 2: Regression results { West Germany
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable: expected future work ability
Questionnaire: 63 (D) .288 .293 .289
(.071)¤¤¤ (.071)¤¤¤ (.071)¤¤¤
Questionnaire: 67 (D) -.131 -.132 -.136
(.071)¤ (.071)¤ (.071)¤
Number of children .091 .103 .106
(.079) (.081) (.082)
Age -.182 -.164 -.195
(.161) (.161) (.178)
Age: 18-40 in 1990 (D) -.202 -.171 -.171
(.162) (.162) (.163)
University degree (D) .368 .220 .226
(.112)¤¤¤ (.118)¤ (.118)¤
Vocational degree (D) -.180 -.230 -.218
(.084)¤¤ (.091)¤¤ (.091)¤¤
HH income p.p. = 1000 (EUR) .014 .003 .005
(.034) (.035) (.035)
Contrib. to HH inc. (%) .011 .025 .020
(.074) (.079) (.080)
Expectation: Germany's economy .086 .077 .078
(.017)¤¤¤ (.017)¤¤¤ (.017)¤¤¤
Satisfaction with work .024 .024
(.013)¤ (.013)¤
Exhausting act. in work or leisure (D) -.195 -.193
(.064)¤¤¤ (.064)¤¤¤
Life expectancy (years) .012 .012
(.004)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤
Year of ¯rst contribution .023
(.010)¤¤
Controls:
Demographic, ¯nancial and institutional YES YES YES
Job and health characteristics NO YES YES
Public pension account details NO NO YES
Health characteristics: Prob > Chi
2 0.0002 0.0002
Obs. 1,350 1,350 1,349
Ordered probit regression of work ability expectations on di®erent sets of controls. All variables from the
respective categories of control variables shown in table A.2 are included, but most are not shown here. Data
are taken from SAVE 2006 and SAVE 2007. For speci¯cation (3), we have additionally matched the survey
data with o±cial German social security data. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signi¯cance level:
¤¤¤ : p < 0:001; ¤¤ : p < 0:05; ¤ : p < 0:1Table 3: Regression results { East Germany
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable: expected future work ability
Questionnaire: 63 (D) .268 .282 .296
(.117)¤¤ (.124)¤¤ (.124)¤¤
Questionnaire: 67 (D) .258 .203 .214
(.120)¤¤ (.123)¤ (.124)¤
Number of children -.098 -.102 -.163
(.149) (.154) (.160)
Age -.303 -.123 -.219
(.280) (.291) (.288)
Age: 18-40 in 1990 (D) -.471 -.470 -.455
(.250)¤ (.255)¤ (.268)¤
University degree (D) .357 .237 .139
(.222) (.236) (.251)
Vocational degree (D) -.002 .031 -.107
(.193) (.191) (.209)
HH income p.p. = 1000 (EUR) -.107 -.129 -.154
(.071) (.077)¤ (.077)¤¤
Contrib. to HH inc. (%) -.252 -.234 -.253
(.119)¤¤ (.118)¤¤ (.120)¤¤
Expectation: Germany's economy .053 .064 .071
(.029)¤ (.029)¤¤ (.030)¤¤
Satisfaction with work .046 .046
(.020)¤¤ (.020)¤¤
Exhausting act. in work or leisure (D) -.098 -.094
(.109) (.110)
Life expectancy (years) .027 .027
(.007)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤
Year of ¯rst contribution -.010
(.006)¤
Controls:
Demographic, ¯nancial and institutional YES YES YES
Job and health characteristics NO YES YES
Public pension account details NO NO YES
Health characteristics: Prob > Chi
2 0.0000 0.0000
Obs. 502 502 502
Ordered probit regression of work ability expectations on di®erent sets of controls. All variables from the
respective categories of control variables shown in table A.2 are included, but most are not shown here. Data
are taken from SAVE 2006 and SAVE 2007. For speci¯cation (3), we have additionally matched the survey
data with o±cial German social security data. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signi¯cance level:
¤¤¤ : p < 0:001; ¤¤ : p < 0:05; ¤ : p < 0:1Table 4: Sensitivity analysis { Fully interacted model
(1) (2)
Dep. variable: expected future work ability
Questionnaire: 63 (D) .290 .282
(.071)¤¤¤ (.067)¤¤¤
Questionnaire: 63 * East (D) .013 -.012
(.143) (.135)
Questionnaire: 67 (D) -.135 -.148
(.071)¤ (.067)¤¤
Questionnaire: 67 * East (D) .359 .407
(.143)¤¤ (.135)¤¤¤
Number of children .106 .078
(.081) (.075)




Age * East .002 -.004
(.337) (.319)
HH income p.p. = 1000 (EUR) .004 .027
(.035) (.032)
HH income p.p. = 1000 (EUR) * East -.160 -.136
(.085)¤ (.077)¤
Exhausting act. in work or leisure (D) -.192 -.209
(.064)¤¤¤ (.059)¤¤¤
Exhausting activities * East (D) .103 .124
(.126) (.118)
Year of ¯rst contribution .023 .015
(.010)¤¤ (.009)
Year of ¯rst contr. * East -.035 -.014
(.011)¤¤¤ (.014)
Controls:
Demographic, ¯nancial and institutional YES YES
Job and health characteristics YES YES
Public pension account details YES YES
Health characteristics: Prob > Chi
2 0.0002 0.0001
Obs. 1,851 2,085
Ordered probit regression of work ability expectations on di®erent sets of controls. All variables from table A.2
are included in the estimations, but most are not shown here. Data are taken from SAVE 2006 and SAVE 2007
and matched with information from German social security data. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Signi¯cance level: ¤¤¤ : p < 0:001; ¤¤ : p < 0:05; ¤ : p < 0:1Table A.1: Institutional background
Cohort Statutory Retirement Age
(year of birth)
1947 { 1957 65 +1 month
for all following cohorts raised by 1 additional month
1958 65 +12 months
1959 { 1962 65 +14 months
for all following cohorts raised by 2 months
1963 65 +22 months
1964 { present 67
Exceptions cohorts 1954 and older, who agreed on partial retirement
(Altersteilzeit) before 01.01.2007;
claimants of bene¯ts for unemployed mining workers
(Anpassungsgeld fÄ ur entlassene Arbeitnehmer des Bergbaus)
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung.
36Table A.2: Summary statistics
West East
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev.
Demographic, ¯nancial and institutional variables
No. of children 0.677 0.468 0.753 0.432
Voc. degree (D) 0.722 0.749
Univ. degree (D) 0.135 0.181
HH income per person (EUR) 990.66 831.38 785.71 665.45
Female (D) 0.554 0.578
Married (D) 0.604 0.528
Age 39.736 10.36 41.855 10.647
Contrib. to HH inc. (%) 0.589 0.492 0.6 0.49
Age: 18-40 in 1990 (D) 0.631 0.669
A®ected by reform (D) 0.587 0.472
Exp.: own econ. sit. 4.961 2.277 4.231 2.338
Pessimism 3.397 2.545 3.608 2.577
Strong income °uctuations (D) 0.323 0.398
Total net wealth (EUR) 127,106 305,167 55,088 161,369
Exp.: German econ. sit. 3.635 2.273 3.233 2.189
Financial literacy measure 1 (D)13 0.725 0.775
Financial literacy measure 2 (D)14 0.679 0.757
Financial literacy measure 3 (D)15 0.54 0.542
13
Correct answer to the question: Suppose that you have EUR 100 on your bank account. This money will give you a 2%
interest and you will leave it on that bank account for 5 years. What would you think: how much money will be on your bank account
after 5 years? The respondent could choose between three possible answers, one of which was correct.
14
Correct answer to the question: Suppose that the money on your bank account yields an interest of 1% per year and that the
in°ation rate is 2% per year. What do you think: After one year, could you buy as least as much, more, or less with your money
than today? The respondent could choose between three possible answers, one of which was correct.
15
Correct answer to the question: Is the following claim true or false? \Investing your money in a single stock in general yields
a safer return than investing your money in a fund." The respondent could choose between three possible answers, one of which
37Future planning measure16 6.679 2.086 6.861 1.974
Time preference measure17 5.443 2.506 5.9 2.533
Job and health variables
Satisf. with work18 6.088 2.789 5.384 3.229
Exhausting activities (D) 0.655 0.633
Blue-collar worker (D) 0.171 0.171
White-collar worker (D) 0.296 0.277
Unemployed (D) 0.104 0.263
Unempl. rate in fed. state 9.894 2.212 16.323 4.103
Social insur. (D) 0.528 0.504
Social insur., self-empl. (D) 0.039 0.03
Marginal social insur. (D) 0.085 0.07
Risk-taking in sports & leisure 3.861 2.828 3.673 2.822
Expected health 6.38 2.25 6.096 2.316
Smoker (D) 0.358 0.373
Life expectancy (years)19 78.284 8.383 77.548 8.686
Self-assessed health 2.235 0.769 2.341 0.795
Satisfaction with health 6.779 2.495 6.614 2.36
No. of GP visits 5.100 6.601 4.876 5.602
Been to hosp. (D) 0.138 0.118
Days in hosp. 1.354 5.801 1.303 6.029
Heart disease (D) 0.035 0.044
High blood pressure (D) 0.144 0.237
was correct.
16
Individual appraisal on a scale between 0 and 10: degree of planning for the future.
17
Individual appraisal on a scale between 0 and 10: degree of patience.
18
If not stated otherwise, individual appraisals (e.g., satisfaction with work or health) are measured as a categorical variable
of integers between 0 and 10.
19
The variable life expectancy is measured in a complicated procedure consisting of three di®erent survey questions. Respon-
dents are asked, ¯rst, how they estimate the average life expectancy of their cohort for both genders separately. Second, they
are asked whether they expect to live just as long, longer, or shorter than their cohort. In a third step, respondents are asked
to estimate the number of years which they expect to live longer or shorter.
38High cholest. (D) 0.119 0.124
Stroke (D) 0.013 0.002
Lung disease (D) 0.068 0.064
Cancer (D) 0.036 0.04
Psychological illness (D) 0.064 0.078
Back problems (D) 0.182 0.191
Other illnesses (D) 0.264 0.301
Chronic illnesses (D) 0.364 0.404
Public pension account details
Year of ¯rst contribution 1983.6 10.093 1981.8 10.951
Non-contr. times, but recognised 3.794 4.496 9.272 11.585
Contribution/year in 2005 75.970 30.059 63.116 18.149
Contribution/year in 2004 74.797 29.385 61.589 18.371
Average time of unemployment in 2005 13.187 9.008 18.770 13.207
Average time of unemployment in 2004 13.112 9.508 18.492 13.245
No. of obs. 1,350 502
39Table A.3: Summary statistics (Politbarometer data)
West East
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Supporting the pension reform (D) 0.299 0.176
Opinion: strong con°. between young and old (D) 0.295 0.347




20 6.364 2.397 6.756 2.431
Female (D) 0.499 0.496
Expectation: Germany's economic sit. worse (D) 0.259 0.28
Fed. elec. 2002: vote for CDU/CSU/SPD (D) 0.704 0.583
Fed. elec. 2002: vote for GrÄ une (D) 0.088 0.055
Fed. elec. 2002: vote for FDP (D) 0.071 0.051
Fed. elec. 2002: vote for PDS (D) 0.035 0.193
Married (D) 0.642 0.623
Has children (D) 0.681 0.767
Part-time or temp. job (D) 0.145 0.095
In educ. or milit. service (D) 0.064 0.055
Pensioner (D) 0.203 0.278
Unemployed (D) 0.029 0.108
Not working (spouse, pat. leave) (D) 0.074 0.036
Employed (D) 0.485 0.428
Highest school degree: upper secondary (D) 0.704 0.538
University degree (D) 0.006 0.265
Size of residential area (categories)
21 4.531 2.477 4.074 2.554
No. of obs. 862 472
20Categories: 1 = 18{29; 2 = 21{24; 3 = 25{29; 4 = 30{34; 5 = 35{39; 6 = 40{44; 7 = 45{49; 8 =
50{59; 9 = 60{69; 10 = 70 and older.
21Categories: 1 = less or equal to 2,000 inhabitants; 2 = more than 2,000 and less than or equal to
5,000 inhabitants; 3 = more than 5,000 and less than or equal to 10,000 inhabitants; 4 = more than
10,000 and less than or equal to 20,000 inhabitants; 5 = more than 20,000 and less than or equal to
50,000; 6 = more than 50,000 and less than or equal to 100,000; 6 = more than 100,000 and less than
or equal to 500,000; 7 = more than 500,000 inhabitants.
40Table A.4: Regression results { Politbarometer
Germany West East
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Supporting the pension reform
Eastern Germany (D) -.386
(.099)¤¤¤
Gender (D) -.313 -.253 -.444
(.088)¤¤¤ (.110)¤¤ (.151)¤¤¤
Married (D) .095 .219 -.161
(.091) (.113)¤ (.160)
Children (D) -.312 -.305 -.387
(.111)¤¤¤ (.136)¤¤ (.196)¤¤
Upper sec. degree (D) .470 .615 .155
(.103)¤¤¤ (.118)¤¤¤ (.224)
University degree (D) .526 .401
(.170)¤¤¤ (.227)¤
Employed (D) .009 .059 .314
(.199) (.240) (.547)
Unemployed (D) -.368 -.595 .062
(.298) (.441) (.598)
Part-time or temp. empl. (D) -.037 .067 -.065
(.228) (.275) (.604)
Pensioner (D) .220 .280 .500
(.263) (.317) (.619)
Elec. 2002: CDU/CSU or SPD (D) .292 .261 .300
(.147)¤¤ (.178) (.271)
Exp.: own economic situation worse (D) -.244 -.260 -.180
(.094)¤¤¤ (.114)¤¤ (.172)
Opinion: strong con°. betw. young and old (D) .084 .113 -.020
(.087) (.106) (.158)
Opinion: strong con°. betw. East and West (D) -.139 -.157 -.025
(.082)¤ (.101) (.149)
Obs. 1,334 862 472
Source (data): Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2007).






















male female male female male female
west east
Source (data): SHARE (2008)
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